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NOTE
PRODUCTS LIABILITY: IMPOSING STRICT PRODUCTS
LIABILITY ON THE TRADEMARK LICENSOR-Connelly v.
Uniroyal, Inc., 75 ill. 2d 393, 389 N.E.2d 155 (1979).
INTRODUCTION

The recent case of Connelly v. Uniroyal, Inc., presents an interesting combination of two separate areas of the law: trademark'
and strict products liability.3 These two areas, while differing in the
scope of protection offered, have evolved from one basic policy, that
is, a deep concern for the welfare of the purchasing public. The former
protects the consumer economically by theoretically assuring that the
purchaser will, in fact, be buying what he intends to buy. The latter
protects the consumer by holding a manufacturer strictly liable for injuries caused by its defective product.'

Both are based on warranty

1. 75 Ill. 2d 393, 389 N.E.2d 155 (1979).

2. For a general overview of trademark law see S. OPPENHEIM & G. WESTON, UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICES AND CONSUMER PROTECTION, 31-216 (3d ed. 1974); J. MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETION (1973); Rogers, The Lanham Act and the
Social Function of Trade-Marks, 14 LA WAND CONTEMP. PROB. 173 (1949); Schecter,
The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, 40 HARV. L. REv. 813 (1927).
3. For a general discussion of strict products liability law see R. HURSH & R.
BAILEY, AMERICAN LAW OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY

(2d ed. 1974); Traynor, The Ways

and Meanings of Defective Products and Strict Liability, 32 TENN. L. REV. 363 (1965);
Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel, 69 YALE L. J. 1099 (1960); Gilliam, Products
Liability in a Nutshell, 37 ORE. L. REv. 119 (1958).
4. See Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403, 412 (1916); Manhattan
Medicine Co. v. Wood, 108 U.S. 218, 223 (1883); Mariniello v. Shell Oil Co., 511 F.
2d 853, 858 (3d Cir. 1975).
5. See Suvada v. White Motor Co., 32 Ill. 2d 612, 210 N.E.2d 182 (1965); Temple
v. Wear United, Inc., 50 Ohio St. 2d 317, 364 N.E. 2d 267 (1977).
Many jurisdictions have adopted RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402 A
(1965), which provides:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably
dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for
physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property,
if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of
his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into
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theory,' and each is supported by the rationale that enforcement of the

7
law will encourage the manufacture of better products.
There are, however, some differences. Strict products liability accomplishes its objectives directly, by allowing the injured consumer to
bring suit against the manufacturer 8 and others 9 in the distributive

chain. Trademark law has developed a more circuitous route to
achieve its purposes. Protection is not given directly to the consumer
but to the trademark owner who, in order to prevent public deception,
can bring an infringement action against those who copy or imitate his
mark.'" Thus the mark owner becomes the "vicarious avenger"" of
the public's injury. ' At least in theory, the consumer should be able to
continue to rely on the trademark as a symbol of the quality he has
come to expect from products bearing the mark 3 because of the mark
owner's self-interest in protecting the goodwill that he has established
in his business via the mark.
Originally, protection of the trademark owner was the "means"
used to accomplish the "end," that is, protection of the consumer.
any contractual relation with the seller.
A complete, continually updated list of jurisdictions adopting strict products
liability, either by legislative enactment or judicial decree can be found in HURSH &
BAILEY, supra note 3, at § 4.41.
6. See Traynor, supra note 3, at 363-66; Schechter, supra note 2, at 822-23.
7. See Standard Brands, Inc. v. Smidler, 151 F.2d 34, 41 (2d Cir. 1945) (Frank,
J., concurring); Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal. 2d 256, 262, 391 P.2d 168,
171, 37 Cal. Rptr. 896, 899 (1964).
8. See, e.g., Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27
Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963); Daryl v. Ford Motor Co., 440 S.W. 2d 630 (Tex. 1969).
9. Strict products liability has been held to extend to a wholesaler in Cooley v.
Quick Supply Co., 221 N.W.2d 763 (Iowa 1974); a retailer in Suvada v. White Motor
Co., 32 Ill. 2d 612, 210 N.E.2d 182 (1965); a lessor in McClaflin v. Bayshore Equip.
Rental Co., 274 Cal. App. 2d 446, 79 Cal. Rptr. 337 (1969); a contractor in State Stove
Mfg. Co. v. Hodges, 189 So.2d 113 (Miss. 1966); a component parts manufacturer in
Burbage v. Boiler Eng'r & Supply Co., 433 Pa. 319, 249 A.2d 563 (1969); and to an
assembler in Putnam v. Erie City Mfg. Co., 338 F.2d 911 (5th Cir. 1964).
10. See, e.g., Manhattan Medicine Co. v. Wood, 108 U.S. 218, 222-23 (1882); Colligan v. Activities Club, 442 F. 2d 686 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1004 (1971).
11. Ames Publishing Co. v. Walker-Davis Publications Inc., 372 F. Supp. 1, 14
(E.D. Pa. 1974).
12. From a practical standpoint, the trademark owner has a greater stake in an infringement suit, justifying his role as guardian of consumer interests, because of lost
sales and his potential loss of goodwill and reputation. A deceived customer may suffer
such inconsequential monetary loss as to preclude him from taking his claim to court,
or even from writing a letter of complaint.
13. This is the "guarantee" theory of trademarks. See Menendez v. Faber, Coe &
Gregg, Inc., 345 F. Supp. 527, 556 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), modified sub nom.Menendez v.
Saks & Co., 485 F.2d 1355 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 991 (1976). See
generally Goldstein, ProductsLiability and the Trademark Owner: When a Trademark
is a Warranty, 67 TRADEMARK REP. 587 (1977); Hanak, The Quality Assurance Function of Trademarks, 43 FORDHAM L. REV. 363 (1974).
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This protection was facilitated by judicial recognition of a "property"
interest in the trademark."' Gradually the mark owner was accorded
more extensive protection of his judicially created property interest in
the trademark until protection of the property interest became an
"end" in itself. Unfortunately, this was often at the expense of the
consumer whose needs had originally prompted the creation of the
mark owner's interest in the trademark.' 5 Consequently, the owner of
a registered trademark is extensively protected legislatively and
judicially while consumers are left to rely on the trademark owner to
look out for their interests. '6 There has been virtually no judicial notice
of this plight of consumers in their relationship with the trademark
owner.
In Connelly v. Uniroyal, Inc. ," the Supreme Court of Illinois was
presented with an opportunity to reevaluate the trademark owner's
relationship with and responsibility to the consumer, and to impose
strict products liability on a trademark owner.
FACTS AND HOLDING
In November of 1970, the plaintiff, John Connelly, was injured in
an automobile accident on a Colorado highway. He filed suit against
several defendants, alleging that the accident, and therefore his injuries, resulted from a defective tire on his 1969 Opel.' 8 The tire had
been manufactured by Englebert Belgique S.A. but bore the name
"Uniroyal."'! Englebert sold the tire to General Motors, who subsequently installed it on the Opel in Belgium and shipped the car to the
United States for sale.20
14. There has been some controversy as to whether there legitimately exists a "property" interest in a trademark and, therefore, whether the judiciary only took notice of
that interest or instead actually created it. See, e.g., Cohen, TranscendentalNonsense
and the FunctionalApproach, 35 COLUM. L. REv. 809, 814-17 (1935). This author suggests the legalistic reasoning is circular: a trademark is "property" because it has value
and is therefore legally protectable, but it only has this value because it is legally protected.
15. For a general discussion of the law's benign neglect of the consumer see Standard Brands, Inc. v. Smidler, 151 F.2d 34, 40-42 (2d Cir. 1945) (Frank, J., concurring).
16. See, e.g., Colligan v. Activities Club, 442 F.2d 686 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 1004 (1971).
17. Connelly v. Uniroyal, Inc., 75 Ill. 2d 393, 389 N.E.2d 155 (1979).
18. Id.
19. While the tire bore the legend "made in Belgium," there was no indication on
the tire that Englebert, not Uniroyal, had actually manufactured it. Connelly v.
Uniroyal, Inc., 55 Ill. App. 3d 530, 538, 370 N.E.2d 1189, 1195 (1977).
20. The car had been purchased by Connelly's father in September of 1969. Id. At
one time this fact alone would have precluded him from maintaining a suit against
even the manufacturer, Englebert, because of the previous requirement that there be
privity of contract between the parties. See, e.g., Wesley v. Serberling Rubber Co., 90
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Connelly brought this action against Englebert, the manufacturer
of the tire, and its parent company, Uniroyal, Inc., which had permitted its trademark to appear on the tire.' Uniroyal filed a motion for
summary judgment contending that it could not be held liable to Connelly because it had not designed, manufactured, or sold the tire in
question and was not, therefore, in the chain of distribution."
Uniroyal's motion was denied by the circuit court but was reversed on
appeal.2 3 The Supreme Court of Illinois reversed the court of appeals'
decision and remanded the case to the circuit court for trial on the
merits. The Supreme Court ruled that it was not an essential prerequisite to a finding of liability for Uniroyal to have been a link in the
chain of distribution, and instead emphasized Uniroyal's profitseeking motive and role in the entire marketing enterprise.2 ' The court
F. Supp. 709 (W.D. Mo. 1950); Murphy v. Plymouth Motor Corp., 3 Wash. 2d 180,
100 P.2d (1940). See generally Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel, 69 YALE L.J.
1099 (1960).
This bar to suit was gradually eroded by the courts, first by allowing recovery
against food processors to anyone injured by their products. See, e.g., Parks v. Yost
Pie Co., 93 Kan. 344, 144 P. 202 (1914); Mazetti v. Armour & Co., 75 Wash. 2d 622,
135 P. 633 (1913). Several jurisdictions followed by expanding the definition of
"buyer" to include the purchaser's family and household. See, e.g., Baker v. Sears
Roebuck & Co., 16 F. Supp. 925 (S.D. Cal. 1936); White Sewing Mach. Co. v. Feisel,
28 Ohio App. 152, 162 N.E. 633 (1927). Courts now routinely allow recovery from a
manufacturer for anyone injured by the manufacturer's defective product. See, e.g.,
Delaney v. Towmotor Corp., 339 F.2d 4 (2d Cir. 1964); Elmore v. American Motors
Corp., 70 Cal. 2d 578, 451 P.2d 84, 75 Cal. Rptr. 652 (1969); Piercefield v. Remington
Arms Co., 375 Mich. 85, 133 N.W.2d 129 (1965). But see Winnett v. Winnett, 57 Ill.
2d 7, 310 N.E.2d 1 (1974) (denying recovery to a four year old child injured by a piece
of farm machinery on the basis that she was not a foreseeable plaintiff).
21. 75 Ill. 2d 393, 389 N.E.2d 155 (1979). Englebert and Uniroyal first entered into
a contract in 1962 that permitted Englebert to obtain detailed information as to
Uniroyal's methods, processes and formulas used in the manufacture of tires and
tubes. Id. at 408, 389 N.E.2d at 161. In 1964, Englebert was granted the nonexclusive
right to use the registered trademark "Uniroyal" on it products. This agreement provided for quarterly payments to be made to Uniroyal and included a stipulation "that
the license of the trademark would terminate at such time as Uniroyal should cease to
have the power to exercise management control over that aspect of Englebert's
business which made use of the trademark and logo." 55 Ill. App. 3d 530, 539, 370
N.E.2d 1189, 1196 (1977). In 1966, Englebert Societe Anonyme became known as
Uniroyal Englebert Belgique, S.A. At the time of the manufacture of the tire, a wholly
owned subsidiary of Uniroyal owned approximately 95% of Englebert's outstanding
stock. Id.
22. 75 II. 2d at 408, 389 N.E.2d at 161.
23. 55 IMl.App. 3d 530, 370 N.E.2d 1189.
Englebert had filed a motion to quash service of process based on lack of jurisdiction over the foreign corporation. That motion was denied by the circuit court, a decision upheld by both the Appellate and Supreme Court of Illinois. 75 Ill. 2d 393, 394,
389 N.E.2d 155, 163.
24. 75 II. 2d 393, 394, 389 N.E.2d 155, 163. The court did, however, agree with
the appellate court that nothing appeared in the pleadings to impose vicarious liability
on Uniroyal, despite its virtual ownership of Englebert. Id. at 393, 389 N.E.2d at 162.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol5/iss2/8
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further reasoned that the same public policy considerations that mandated imposition of strict liability on wholesalers and retailers were
also applicable to Uniroyal who was, therefore, a proper defendant. 2
ANALYSIS

Illinois was not the first jurisdiction to address the issue of a
trademark owner's strict liability for a defective product not manufactured by the mark owner. The Supreme Court of California imposed26
liability on a trademark licensor in Kasel v. Remington Arms Co.
That court, acknowledging that it was the first court to impose liability
"upstream" from the manufacturer, based its holding on the "defendant's participatory connection, for his personal profit or other
that created consumer demand for and reliance upon the
benefit, ..
"2
product .
The next opportunity for a court to impose liability on a trademark

licensor did not occur until six years later in City of Hartford v.

Associated Construction Co.2 8 This case is not precisely on point with
Connelly, however, because in City of Hartfordthe trademark licensor, who was subjected to liability by the court, had also supplied its
29
licensee with one of the essential ingredients of the defective product.
This fact alone sufficiently justified imposition of liability on the licensor, although the court based its decision on the licensing relationship.
The paucity of cases in the area of mark licensor liability can par25. Id. at 394, 389 N.E.2d at 163.
26. 24 Cal. App. 3d 711, 101 Cal. Rptr. 314 (1972). Kasel presented a strict liability
claim for injuries received from an exploding shotgun cartridge. The cartridge was
manufactured by CDM, a completely owned Mexican subsidiary of Remington, and
bore Remington's registered trademark. Despite a substantially similar fact situation,
the appellate court in Connelly was able to distinguish Kasel for several reasons. Remingtion, the court maintained had caused CDM to come into existence, while Englebert
had been an established company for many years before its purchase by Uniroyal. 55
Ill. App.3d 530, 541, 370 N.E.2d 1189, 1197. The equipment used in manufacturing
the shell was procured, installed, delivered and designed by Remington. Furthermore,
CDM was managed by a Remington employee. 24 Cal. App. 3d 711, 101 Cal. Rptr.
314. The court found these facts sufficient to distinguish the two cases, and pointed
out that "Uniroyal had neither involved itself in its subsidiary's corporate life nor participated in the manufacture of its subsidiary's product." 55 Ill. App. 3d at 541, 370
N.E.2d at 1197.
The court, however, quickly glossed over its most legitimate reason for
distinguishing Kasel: Remington had actually manufactured the portion of the cartridge in which the gunpowder was contained, although CDM had manufactured the
final product. 24 Cal. App. 3d 711, 101 Cal. Rptr. 314. This fact would place Remington in the position of a component parts manufacturer or supplier, and would have
sufficed for the imposition of strict liability. See note 9 supra.
27. 24 Cal. App.3d 711, 725, 101 Cal. Rptr. 314, 323.
28. 34 Conn. Supp. 204, 384 A.2d 390 (1978).
29. Id. at -, 384 A.2d at 392.
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tially be explained by the fact that, in most instances, the owner of the
mark that appears on the defective product is also the manufacturer,
supplier, or seller of the product." In these instances, courts do not
have to consider the liability of one who only licenses the use of his
trademark; courts can impose liability by utilizing a conventional chain
of distribution theory.
The Connelly court had within its reach an even more compelling
reason, apart from the stated public policy rationale, to impose strict
products liability on Uniroyal." The long history of trademarks, the
recent innovation of trademark licensing," and the legal restrictions on
those who choose to license their marks should combine to place direct
responsibility on the licensor for any product on which his mark appears. In other words, the legal restrictions on the licensor and the
responsibility owed to the public should put the licensor in a position
similar to that of the manufacturer at the pinnacle of the conventional
chain of distribution.
30. 55 IOWA L. REV. 693 (1970).
31. A related issue is indemnification. Indemnification is a means for shifting the
loss (compensatory damages) to the individual who was initially at fault and responsible for that loss. W. KIMBLE & R. LESHER, PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 275 (West 1979).
Because a strict liability action is not based upon a traditional "fault" concept, it
would appear that indemnification principles would be inapplicable to strict products
liability. The "fault," if any, that is involved results only from the sale of a defective
product. Thus, it can be persuasively argued that retailers, wholesalers and manufacturers are equally at "fault" for any defective product they have sold, and should,
therefore, share the loss.
Nonetheless, the general rule is that indemnification from the manufacturer is
proper in these cases. Id. It is permitted because of a policy of placing final responsibility for the defective product on the party initially responsible. Id.
For cases following the general rule permitting indemnification see McCrory
Corp. v. Girard Rubber Corp., 225 Pa. Super. 45, 307 A.2d 435 (1973), aff'd, 459 Pa.
57, 327 A.2d 8 (1974); Texaco Inc. v. McGrew Lumber Co., 117 Iln. App. 2d 351, 254
N.E.2d 584 (1970).
Decisions that have not permitted indemnification of the retailer by the manufacturer are usually based upon the negligence of the retailer. E.g., Wilson v. E-Z Flo
Chemical Co., 281 N.C. 506, 189 S.E.2d 221 (1972) (seller not entitled to indemnification because manufacturer's manual warned against product use in cold weather, but
seller had failed to warn buyer); Ford Motor Co. v. Russell & Smith Ford Co., 474
S.W.2d 549 (Tex. Civ. App. 1971) (dealer entitled to contribution but not indemnification for his aggravation of a defective design in installing an air-conditioning system).
A party is not entitled to indemnification where the indemnitee is also responsible,
either because of active negligence or on a basis of strict liability in the same category
as the indemnitor. They are, however, joint tortfeasors and may be allowed contribution from each other where state law otherwise permits contribution among joint tortfeasors. Price v. Shell Oil Co., 2 Cal. 3d 256-57, 466 P.2d 722, 729, 85 Cal. Rptr. 178,
185 (1970).
32. Until recently trademarks were thought to be only a symbol of the goodwill
associated with a business, and could only be transferred appurtenant to the sale of an
entire business. See Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403, 413-14 (1916).
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A.

History of Trademarks

Although trademark law in the United States is only about 140
years old, 33 the practice of marking goods dates back thousands of
years. 3 ' In ancient civilizations and during medieval times, marks performed three designation functions: possession, contends, and
source.3 It was the third function, designation of source, that provided
information to consumers as to the origin and maker of the goods.
This practice evolved to substantially benefit the buyer in three ways.
First, he could purchase an item, based on its reputation or his
previous experience with it, confident that it would conform to an expected standard of quality. Second, if the goods did not measure up to
his expectations, the mark enabled him to trace the goods to its maker
to voice his complaint and for redress of his injury. Finally, the marking of goods encouraged the production of high quality goods, an obvious consumer benefit. 3"
In addition to these consumer benefits, trademarks also rewarded
the conscientious producer of goods by providing a means of receiving
credit for a quality product and, thereby, reaping the benefits of increased sales. This, in turn, stimulated competition among manufacturers to produce a better product than their counterparts.3
. Trademarks justifiably played an important role in the laissezfaire
theory of economics that developed during the nineteenth century.3"
The main premise behind the theory was that the general economic
welfare of the population and of the country would invariably be promoted by the development of a highly competitive marketing system.39
A corollary of that premise was that vigorous, beneficial competition
33. Rogers, The Lanham Act and the Social Function of Trade-Marks, 14 LAW &

173 (1949).
34. See generally Burrell, Two Hundred Years of English Trade-mark Law, in
Two HUNDRED YEARS OF ENGLISH & AMERICAN PATENT, TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT
CONTEMP. PROB.

LAW, 35, 35-36 (Bicentennial Symposium ABA Section of Patent, Trademark and
Copyright Law (1976)).
35. F. SCHECTER, THE HISTORICAL FOUNDATION OF THE LAW RELATING TO
TRADEMARKS

(1925).

36. Id.
37. See generally Eastern Wine Corp. v. Winslow-Warren Ltd., Inc., 137 F.2d 955,
958 (2d Cir. 1943); Standard Brands, Inc. v. Smidler, 151 F.2d 34, 40-42 (2d Cir. 1945)
(Frank, J., concurring).
One of the functions of trademarks is to point out the product's origin to the consumer, so as to secure to the individual who places a superior product in the
marketplace the fruits of his industry. See Sweetarts v. Sunline Inc., 299 F. Supp. 572
(E.D. Mo. 1969), modified, 436 F.2d 705 (1971).
38. See Standard Brands, Inc., v. Smidler, 151 F.2d 34, 38-39 & nn. 2-8 (2d Cir.
1945).
39. Id. at 39.
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was best fostered by governmental noninterference.'" It soon became
apparent that total noninterference was impossible-too many
unscrupulous merchants and manufacturers did not operate on the
plane of honesty and fair dealing that was necessary for successful implementation of the theory. There developed a general public policy of
discouraging unfair trade practices that became the basis for the
judicially created protection of trademarks." While jurists justified the
creation of a trademark "property right" in terms of consumer protection,' legislatures answered with laws giving practically unqualified
protection to the owner of the trademark.' 3 These laws, aided by
judicial interpretation, eventually made the trademark owner's interest
paramount, sacrificing along the way the rationale that had originally
created the "property right.""
40. Id.
41. Id. at 40.
42. Id.
43. See, e.g., Lanham Trade Mark Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1976) (eliminated
the effect of Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) on state trademark registration
statutes); Diggins, Federal and State Regulation of Trade-Marks, 14 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROB. 200, 213 (1949).
44. Jurists have examined trademarks, which are in actuality no more than just
words-albeit words with commercial connotations-and have found somewhere in
them "property rights." See note 14 supra.
Justice Frankfurter, on the rationale of protecting the trademark owner's "property right," stated:
Whatever the means employed, the aim is the same-to convey through the mark,
in the minds of potential customers, the desirability of the commodity upon which
it appears. Once this is attained, the trade-mark owner has something of value. If
another poaches upon the commercial magnetism of the symbol he has created,
the owner can obtain legal redress.
Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Mfg. Co. v. S.S. Kresge Co., 316 U.S. 203, 205 (1942).
The parameters of property interests in marks were set forth by Justice Brandeis,
dissenting in International News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918):
An essential element of individual property is the legal right to exclude others
from enjoying it. If the property is private, the right of exclusion may be absolute;
if the property is affected with a public interest, the right of exclusion is qualified.
But the fact that a product of the mind has cost its producer money and labor and
has value for which others are willing to pay, is not sufficient to insure to it this
legal attribute of property. The general rule of law is, that the noblest of human
productions - knowledge, truths ascertained, conceptions and ideas - become after
voluntary communication to others, free as the air to common use. Upon these incorporeal productions, the attribute of property is continued after communication
only in certain cases where public policy has seemed to demand it.
Id. at 250.
The.primary problem in identifying property rights in a mark was stated by Justice
Learned Hand in S.C. Johnson & Son v. Johnson, 116 F.2d 427 (2d Cir. 1940):
There is always the danger that we may be merely granting a monopoly, based
upon the notion that by advertising one can obtain some "property" in a name.
We are nearly sure to go astray in any phase of the whole subject, as soon as we
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol5/iss2/8
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Trademark licensing was a classic example of the courts' gradual
erosion of consumer protection. At one time, mark licensing was en5
tirely prohibited because of the "source" theory of trademarks." This
theory was used by courts to prevent potential consumer deception by
requiring that the product be manufactured by the owner of the
trademark that appeared on that product."' This approach was typified
by the statement that "[a] trademark cannot be assigned, or its use
licensed, except as incidental to a transfer of the business or property
in connection with which it has been used."4 7
The "source" theory was criticized, first by commentators and
then by the courts, on the grounds that consumers do not care who actually produces the goods as long as they continue to receive a consistent level of quality from those goods."' This approach became known
9
as the "guarantee" theory of trademarks.
One of the first decisions to take judicial notice of the "guarantee"
0
theory was Lea v. New Home Sewing Machine Co." In an infringement case, the court held that the real issue involved was not "source"
or "origin" but whether licensor control over the production of sewing machines had been exercised to an extent that would protect consumer expectations. 1 Consequently, licensing of trademarks was given
lose sight of the underlying principal that the wrong involved is diverting trade
from the first user by misleading customers who mean to deal with him.
Id. at 429.
For cases that place the trademark owner's rights above that of the consumers, see
Colligan v. Activities Club, 442 F.2d 686 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1004
(1971) (denying consumers standing under § 43(a) of the Lanham Act despite language
therein that the purpose of the Act is to prevent consumer deception and that suit may
be maintained "by any person who believes that he is or is likely to be damaged by the
use of any such false description or representation." 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1976));
Drexel Enterprises, Inc. v. Hermitage Cabinet Shop, Inc., 266 F. Supp. 532 (N.D. Ga.
1967) (holding that the superiority of the infringer's product does not constitute a
defense in a trademark infringement suit); Continental Motors Corp. v. Continental
Aviation Corp., 375 F.2d 857, 860 n.8 (5th Cir. 1967) (noting that there was no longer
a requirement of "deception" as to origin of the product under the Lanham Act);
Boston Professional Hockey Assn., Inc. v. Dallas Cap & Emblem Mfg., Inc., 510 F.2d
1004 (5th Cir. 1975) (admitting that the decision may shift the emphasis in trademark
law from the protection of the public to the protection of the mark owner's business
interest).
45. See, e.g., Kidd v. Johnson, 100 U.S. 617 (1879).
46., Bulte v. Ingleheart Brothers, 137 F. 492, 498-99 (7th Cir. 1905).
47. Macmahan Pharmacal Co. v. Denver Chemical Mfg. Co., 113 F. 468, 474-75
(8th Cir. 1901).
48. Goldstein, Products Liability and the Trademark Owner: When a Trademark
is a Warranty, 67 TRADEMARK REP. 587 (1977).

49. See Pecheur Lozenge Co., Inc. v. National Candy Co., 122 F.2d 318, 319 (3d
Cir. 1941), vacated, 315 U.S. 666 (1942).
50. 139 F. 732 (E.D.N.Y. 1905).

51. Id.
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judicial approval but only if sufficient control was exercised by the
licensor over the licensee in order to maintain the trademark's
"guarantee" function."
This movement toward strengthening trademark protection
culminated in 1946 when Congress enacted the Lanham Trade-Mark
Act." In addition to introducing many new concepts5 ' in trademark
law, the Act also included several provisions that were intended to protect the public from deceptive," unfair, 6 or monopolistic" uses of
trademarks.
B.

The Licensor's Duty To Control

Sections 5 and 45 of the Lanham Act gave a legislative stamp of
approval to the once-prohibited practice of trademark licensing. Section 5 does not use the term "licensing," but permits use of a
registered trademark by a related company. 8 Section 45 of the Act
defines "related company" as one that is legitimately controlled by the
registrant (owner of the mark) in respect to the nature and quality of
the goods.5 9 These two sections and subsequent judicial decisions place
an affirmative duty on the trademark licensor to exercise control over
60
the nature and quality of the goods on which his mark appears.
52. See, e.g., Coca-Cola Co. v. J.G. Butler & Sons, 229 F. 224 (E.D. Ark. 1916)
(licensing approved where licensor set standards for bottling and maintained a supervision and inspection system); B.B. & R. Knight, Inc. v. W.L. Milner & Co., 283 F. 816
(N.D. Ohio 1922) (licensing of trademark "Fruit of the Loom" permitted where owner
exhibited the exercise of complete control of and supplied cloth to the manufacturing
licensee).
53. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1976).
54.
Among these new concepts were: a limited concurrent registration provision,
id. at § 1052(d); an "incontestibility" provision, id. at § 1065; a "use by related companies" provision, id. at § 1055; and a provision for international registry, id. at §
1126.
55. "... provided such mark is not used in such manner as to deceive the public."
Id. at § 1055.
56. Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act was indicative of a Congressional intent to
fashion a new federal remedy against unfair competition. Norman M. Morris Corp. v.
Weinstein, 466 F. 2d 137 (5th Cir. 1972).
57. Under the Lanham Act, it is a defense to an infringement suit that "the mark
has been or is being used to violate the antitrust laws of the United States." 15 U.S.C.
§ 1115(b)(7) (1976).
58. Section 5 provides in addition:
Where a registered mark or mark sought to be registered is or may be used
legitimately by related companies, such use shall inure to the benefit of the
registrant or applicant for registration, and such use shall not affect the validity of
such mark or its registration, provided such mark is not used to deceive the
public.
15 U.S.C. § 1055 (1976).
59. Id. at § 1127.
60. See, e.g., Dawn Donut Co. v. Hart's Food Stores, Inc., 267 F.2d 358 (2d Cir.
1959); Alligator Co. v. Robert Bruce, Inc., 176 F. Supp. 377 (E.D. Pa. 1959).
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This affirmative duty was expressed as a legal responsibility to the
consumer in Morse-Starrett Products Co. v. Steccone: 61
If the owner of a trademark wants to license the use thereof to another
and still retain as his own enjoyment of the rights stemming therefrom,
he must do so in such a way that he maintains sufficient control over the
nature and quality of the finished product, over the activities of the
licensee as will enable the licensor to sustain his original position of
guarantor to the public that the goods now bearing the trademark are of
the same nature and quality as were the goods bearing the trademark
before the licensing, or that the mark now has the same meaning as far as
the public is concerned as it did before the licensing."'
Unfortunately, the Act offers no guidelines as to what constitutes
sufficient control to meet the requirements of the Act.6 3 Consequently,
it has been left to the courts to supply the boundaries of adequate control on a case-by-case basis."' Occasionally over strong dissents, courts
have implied sufficient control from licensing agreements, despite little
evidence in the record that "actual" control was ever exercised by the
licensor. 5
In Dawn Donut Co.," Judge Lumbard had the unlikely distinction
of writing the opinion of the court while dissenting from the majority's
conclusion on an issue crucial to the disposition of the case. His opinion agreed with the majority on the existence of an affirmative duty
to exercise actual control so as to prevent consumer deception and to
maintain product quality;" ' his dissent was based on the absence of
evidence in this particular case that such actual control was ever exercised. 8 The reluctance on the part of the majority to find inadequate
control can be explained by two factors: one, the acknowledged severity
61. 86 F. Supp. 796 (N.D. Cal. 1949).
62. Id. at 805.
63. The only qualification in the statute is that the control must be "legitimate."
15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1976). This would appear to imply, as courts have held, that "actual" control must be exercised. See Dawn Donut Co. v. Hart's Food Stores, Inc., 267
F.2d 358 (2d Cir. 1959).
64. This is reasonable considering the varying complexities of the manufacturing
processes used in different industries.
65. Dawn Donut Co. v. Hart's Food Stores, Inc., 267 F.2d 358 (2d Cir. 1959).
66. Id. Dawn Donut had filed an infringement action against Hart's for using its
federally registered trademark, "Dawn." Hart filed a counterclaim alleging that Dawn
had not exercised control over its numerous licensees and had, therefore, abandoned
its mark. Id. at 360.
67. Id. at 366-67.
68. Id. at 368. The only evidence in the record of "actual" control were visits by
Dawn's salesmen and contractual obligations to use the supplied bakery mixes "as
directed." Id.
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of the penalty for failure to exercise control;69 and, two, the fact that a
suit under the Lanham Act cannot be maintained by the consumers who generally suffer the greatest injury from insufficient quality
control."7
By allowing the mark to be used on a product in light of the legal
responsibility to control the nature and quality of the marked product,
the trademark licensor is, in effect, vouching for the product's quality.
The licensor is representing to and assuring the consumer that the product will live up to the licensor's reputation about products bearing the
mark.
C. Implied Warranty, Consumer Expectations, and The Guarantee
Theory of Trademarks
The licensor of a trademark, based on his affirmative duty to control the quality of the product, vouches for any product on which his
trademark appears, not unlike the implied warranty of merchantability
and fitness for proposed use under section 2-314' 1 and section 2-315 of
the Uniform Commercial Code. Section 2-315 provides:
69. Under the Lanham Act, failure to exercise control constitutes abandonment of
the mark, 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1976), and will result in cancellation of the mark's
registration, id. at § 1064(e).
Failure to exerise control is usually brought to the court's attention in two instances. It is used, either by a defendant as an affirmative defense in an infringment
suit or by a plaintiff in a monopoly action to show that the trademark is being used as
an instrumentality in the violation of the antitrust laws. See, e.g., Switzer Bros., Inc. v.
Locklin, 297 F.2d 39 (7th Cir. 1961) (anti-trust); Dawn Donut Co. v. Hart's Food
Stores, Inc., 267 F.2d 358 (2d Cir. 1959) (infringement); Alligator Co. v. Robert
Bruce, Inc., 176 F. Supp. 377 (E.D. Pa. 1959) (infringement); Cott Beverage Corp. v.
Canada Dry Ginger Ale, 146 F. Supp. 300 (S.D.N.Y. 1956) (anti-trust).
Even if it be assumed that punishment so severe as suggested [i.e. cancellation of
the mark) may be imposed for misuse of a trade-mark, it is certainly to be
doubted that any court would ever go so far ....

Courts whose duty it is to enjoin

practices tending to confuse and deceive the buying public, will not consciously
assist a seller to palm off his goods as those of another.
146 F. Supp. at 303.
70. See Colligan v. Activities Club, 442 F.2d 686 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S.

1004 (1971).

71. U.C.C. § 2-314 (1976 version) provides:
(1) Unless excluded or modified (Section 2-316), a warranty that the goods
shall be merchantable is implied in a contract for their sale if the seller is a merchant with respect to goods of that kind. Under this section the serving for value
of food and drink to be consumed either on the premises or elsewhere is a sale.
(2) Goods to be merchantable must be at least such as
(a) pass without objection in the trade under the contract description; and
(b) in the case of fungible goods, are of fair average quality within the
description; and
(c) are not for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used; and
(d) run, within the variations permitted by the agreement, of even kind,
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol5/iss2/8
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Where the seller at the time of contracting has reason to know any particular purpose for which the goods are required and that the buyer is
relying on the seller's skill of judgment to select or furnish suitable
goods, there is . . . an implied warranty that the goods shall be fit for
such purpose.7"

An implied warranty of safety is included in an implied warranty of
fitness for proposed use and merchantable quality."'
Courts have combined sections 2-314 and 2-315 of the U.C.C. with
section 402 A of the Restatement of Torts to hold that, in a strict products liability suit, a product is defective when it is "unmerchantable"
or "not reasonably fit for the purposes for which it is sold." ' 4 A comment to section 402 A tacitly approves of the acceptance of this position but adds as a caveat that warranty theory under strict liability contemplates an action in tort and, therefore, should not be bound by the
contract rules of warranty relating to reliance, privity, notice, or
disclaimers. '
The reasonable consumer expectation test in strict liability corresponds to one of the functions of trademarks: assurance to the consumer that he is purchasing that which he intends to purchase-a product that conforms to the certain standards of quality and safety that he
quality and quantity within each unit and among all units involved;
and
(e) are adequately contained, packaged, and labeled as the agreement may
require; and
() conform to the promises or affirmations of fact made on the container
or label if any.
(3) Unless excluded or modified (Section 2-316) other implied warranties may
arise from course of dealing or usage of trade.
72. U.C.C. § 2-315 (1976 version).
73. R. HURSH & R. BAILEY, supra note 3, § 4.8 at 658.
74. See, e.g., Greeno v. Clark Equipment Co., 237 F. Supp. 427 (N.D. Ind. 1965);
Sansing v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 354 So.2d 895 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.), cert.
denied, 360 So. 2d 1250 (Fla. 1978); Santor v. A.M. Karaghesian Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 207
A.2d 305 (1965); Herman v. General Irrigation Co., 247 N.W. 2d 472 (N.D. 1976).
75. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402 A, comment m (1965) states:
A number of courts, seeking a theoretical basis for the liability, have resorted to a

"warranty," either running with the goods sold.., or made directly to the consumer without contract ... There is nothing in the Section which would prevent

any court from treating the rule stated as a matter of "warranty" to the user or
consumer. But if this is done, it should be recognized and understood that the
"warranty" is a very different kind of warranty from those usually found in the
sale of goods, and that it is not subject to the various contract rules which have
grown up to surround such sales.

Connelly would have been affected by two of these limitations in a contract action-privity, see note 20, supra and reliance. Under the U.C.C. and a contract theory,
a plaintiff must show reliance on the implied warranty of the manufacturer of the product. In Connelly, neither the plaintiff nor his father knew who had manufactured or
whose name appeared on the tire. It would have been, therefore, impossible for either
of them to have relied on Englebert's or Uniroyal's representation.
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has come to expect from products bearing the same mark. Under the
consumer expectation test, if a product fails to conform to the
reasonable expectations of the consumer at the time of purchase, the
product is defective, and the plaintiff in a strict liability lawsuit has
proven one of the elements of his case. He still must prove, however,
that the defect rendered the product unreasonably dangerous and that
the defect caused his injury.76 By acknowledging the similarity of the
"guarantee" function of trademarks to implied warranties and the
consumer expectation test for strict products liability, the Connelly
court would have had a further basis for imposing liability on
Uniroyal.
D.

Strict Products Liability and the Ability to Control

Wholesalers and retailers, when faced with a strict products liability
lawsuit, frequently contend as a defense that they were not in a position to control the defect in the product that caused the injury.77 This
defense is usually quickly dismissed by the courts for public policy
reasons. For example, in Dunham v. Vaughn & Bushnell Mfg. Co., 8
strict liability was imposed on the wholesaler of a defective hammer
that passed through his warehouse in an unopened container. That
court reasoned that liability extended to the wholesaler, not because of
an ability to control the defect in the product before it reached the
eventual consumer, but because of the wholesaler's role in the production and marketing enterprise." While retailers and wholesalers cannot
76. Mooney v. Fibreboard, 485 F. Supp. 242 (1980).
77. See, e.g., Kasel v. Remington Arms Co., 24 Cal. App. 3d 711, 101 Cal. Rptr.
314 (1972); Canifax v. Hercules Powder Co., 237 Cal. App. 2d 44, 46 Cal. Rptr. 552
(1965).
In Canifax, the defendant, Hercules, was held strictly liable in an action arising
from a dynamite explosion, despite the fact that it had only processed an order for
dynamite fuses. In imposing strict liability, the court stated: "The fact that it [Hercules] chooses to delegate the manufacture of [the] fuse to another and that it causes
the manufacturer to ship the product directly to the consumer cannot be an escape
hatch to avoid liability." 237 Cal. App. 2d at 52, 46 Cal. Rptr. at 557.
78. 86 Ill. App. 2d 315, 229 N.E.2d 684 (1967), aff'd, 42 Ill. 2d 339, 247 N.E.2d
401 (1969).
79. Other frequently expressed rationales for imposing liability on all members in
the conventional distributive chain were set forth in Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co.,
61 Cal. 2d 256, 391 P.2d 168, 37 Cal. Rptr. 896 (1964): (1) It places the cost of injuries
from defective products on those that reap the profits and are, therefore, best able to
bear the costs. Id. at 262, 391 P.2d at 171, 37 Cal. Rptr. at 899; (2) Imposition of
liability on others in the chain works no injustice on those members because they are in
a position to adjust the cost in a continuing business relationship and can look to the
manufacturer for indemnity. Id. at 263, 391 P.2d at 172, 37 Cal. Rptr. at 900; and (3)
In some instances the retailer or wholesaler may be the only member of the chain that
is reasonably available to be sued. Id. at 262, 391 P.2d at 171, 37 Cal. Rptr. at 899.
Indeed, had Illinois' long-arm statute not extended to foreign manufacturers, the
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realistically be expected to control a defective product's entry into the
marketplace once manufactured, they are in a position to exert
pressure on manufacturers to produce safer products in the future.
Holding these individuals strictly liable for defective products that pass
through their hands encourages them-and not too subtly-to exercise
this form of indirect control, even if it is after the fact and an injury
has already occurred.
In Kasel v. Remington-Arms, Inc.,8" the court dismissed Remington's claim that it lacked an ability to control the product. The
court reiterated its position that lack of an ability to control the product had never been considered sufficient by that court to absolve a
defendant of liability, but added that an ability to control, if existing,
would be a significant factor favoring the imposition of liability. 8
The Kasel court, like Connelly, did not take notice of the fact that
a trademark licensor not only has an ability to control the product, but
also has a statutory duty to exercise that control. This duty to control
sufficiently justifies imposing liability on the trademarkJ licensor
because he is, in effect, responsible for the manufacture of the defective product.
CONCLUSION

It would be incongruous to hold a defendant, such as a retailer or a
distributor, liable for an injury caused by a defective product the quality
of which was beyond his ability to control, and to exculpate a
trademark licensor who has a legal obligation to directly control the
nature and quality of the product during manufacture. In Connelly, a
duty to control existed that was consistent with and substantially
parallel to the objectives of section 402 A of the Restatement of Torts
and strict products liability. This duty to control could have been
utilized by the court to consider Uniroyal as being in a position similar
to that of the manufacturer, Englebert, in a conventional chain of
distribution. Together Englebert and Uniroyal combined their efforts
to induce consumers to buy their product. Both had a responsibility to
exercise control over the manufacture of the tire and both should share
equally the responsibility for any injuries caused by their defective product.
Connelly court would not have had jurisdiction to hear a suit against the manufacturer, Englebert. See note 23, supra. In other instances, a plaintiff may not know who
the manufacturer is or the manufacturer may be insolvent.
80. 24 Cal. App. 3d 711, 101 Cal. Rptr. 314 (1972). See notes 26 & 27 and accompanying text supra.
81. Id. at 725, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 324.
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Justice Traynor gave a most persuasive argument for imposition of
strict liability on a trademark licensor in°1944:
As handicrafts have been replaced by mass production with its great
markets and transportation facilities, the close relationship between the
producer and consumer of a product has been altered. Manufacturing
processes, frequently valuable secrets, are ordinarily either inaccessible to
or beyond the ken of the general public. The consumer no longer has
means or skill enough to investigate for himself the soundness of a product, even when it is not contained in a sealed package, and his erstwhile
vigilance has been lulled by the steady efforts of manufacturers to build
up confidence by advertising and marketing devices such as trademarks
....

Consumers no longer approach products warily but accept them on

faith, relying on the reputation of the manufacturer or the trademark ....
The manufacturer's obligation to the consumer must keep pace with the
changing relationship between them; it cannot be escaped because the
marketing of a product has become so complicated as to require one or
more intermediaries."

Thirty-six years later these arguments are even more persuasive.
Trademarks have evolved to become an important tool in the commercial marketing of a product. The Lanham Act and the federal courts
have firmly entrenched the trademark owner's property interest as
superior to that of the public interest. By holding a trademark licensor
strictly liable for defective products bearing his mark and within his
ability to control, the courts can reaffirm the original commitment of
the trademark as an indication of source and guarantee of quality.
Mary Stanley Silverberg
82. Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 467-68, 150 P.2d 436, 443
(1944) (Traynor, J., concurring).
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